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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter was initially appealed to the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Code Ann. Section 
78-2-2(3)(j) (1953 as amended) in that the appeal was taken from 
a final order of the Fourth Judicial District court over which the 
Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. On or about November 1, 1990, this matter was 
assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff/Appellant from an Order 
dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint due to lack of personal 
jurisdiction over each of the named Defendants. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Their are only three (3) issues presented by this appeal. 
The issues are related to each other. 
(1) "Whether or not there exists specific personal 
jurisdiction over each of the appellees based on their 
minimal contacts with the state of Utah sufficient to 
allow the state of Utah to resolve a dispute over the 
amount of professional fees claimed by the Plaintiff 
where the three (3) named Defendants all reside in 
California and conduct all their trade or business within 
the state of California." 
(2) "Whether or not the assertion of jurisdiction 
requiring each of the three (3) named Defendants to 
defend themselves in a foreign state violates the due 
process clause of the 14th amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and the corresponding due process clause of 
the Utah State Constitution." 
(3) "Whether or not due process of law is 
substantively afforded each of the three (3) Defendants 
when they are required to defend themselves in a foreign 
state while at the same time the Plaintiff is conducting 
its trade or business in the Defendant's home state." 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of appellate review in this issue is the 
"correction of error" standard because the District Court's 
decision was based solely on the pleadings filed in the case and 
involved no assessment of witness credibility or competency. See 
R.R.F. v. Felan. 760 .2d 906, 209 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Thus, the 
Court of Appeals is in "as good as position as the trial court to 
examine the evidence jie novo and determine the facts." In re 
Adoption of Infant Anonymous, 760 P. 2d 916, 918 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The issue presented is one of law and does not involve the 
merits of the Plaintiff's alleged claim. 
V. STATEMENT OF STATUTES 
The application of Utah's Long-Arm Statute is necessary for 
the proper resolution of the issue of jurisdiction in this case. 
The statute reads as follows: 
[I]t is declared, as a matter of legislative 
determination, that the public interest demands the state 
provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons who, through certain 
significant minimal contacts with the state, incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's 
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protection• This legislative action is deemed necessary 
because of technological progress which has substantially 
increased the flow of commerce between several states 
resulting in increased interaction between persons of 
this state and persons of other states. (Emphasis Added). 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum 
protection to citizens of this state, should be applied 
so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-22 (1953 as amended). 
VI. STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads 
as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution reads as 
follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the attempt to make collection on a 
disputed commercial account by a Utah partnership against a 
corporation organized under the laws of the State of California 
and two (2) individuals who reside in California who supposedly 
"guaranteed" the corporation's debt. The Plaintiff claims in its 
complaint that the individually named Defendants "guaranteed" the 
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debt of the corporation Defendant, but no documents are attached 
to the complaint setting forth the terms and conditions of the 
guarantee agreement sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds for 
either the state of California or the state of Utah. 
The Plaintiffs claim that each of the Defendants are jointly 
and severally liable for the total amount due. 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The Corporate Defendant Laray Company, Inc. is a 
California corporation. The Corporate Defendant has never 
conducted any business in the State of the state of Utah nor does 
it have customers or retail outlets in this state. (Exhibit "A". 
Paragraphs 2 and 5). 
2. The individual defendants are residents of California 
and have no business interests in Utah and their sole contact with 
the state of Utah is based on their employment relationship with 
the corporate defendant. (Exhibit lfB" Paragraph 3; Exhibit "A" 
Paragraphs 1 and 3). 
3. The Plaintiff (formerly a California business) is a Utah 
partnership which is presently doing business in the state of 
California by rendering services to the Defendant of the type 
described in the complaint which it has done for the past 18 or 
more years. The Plaintiff employs various employees or agents in 
Utah and elsewhere in order to carry out its trade or business and 
regularly sends employees to California to service clients such as 
Laray Company. (Exhibit "A11 Paragraph 6 to 7; Exhibit wCff 
Paragraphs 8 to 17; Exhibit ,fBlf Paragraphs 6 to 7). 
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4. The corporate Defendant does not own personal property 
or conduct a trade or business in the state of Utah at present or 
in the past. No trade or business assets are located within the 
state of Utah. The Defendants do not employ any employees or other 
agents within the state of Utah and have no contact with residents 
of the state of Utah except the present relationship with the 
Plaintiff which began in California. (Exhibit "A11, Paragraphs 4 
to 7; Exhibit "B" Paragraphs 4 to 7). 
5. The corporate Defendant has no commercial accounts either 
wholesale or retail within the state of Utah. (Exhibit "A" 
Paragraphs 4 to 5). 
6. The corporate Defendant business has never qualified to 
do business in the state of Utah. (Exhibit "A" Paragraphs 4 to 5). 
7. The Defendant Corporation is a business which is operated 
by the individual Defendants in the city of La Habra, California 
which is located in Orange County, state of California. (Exhibit 
"A11 Paragraph 2). 
8. The Defendants have not consented to jurisdiction in the 
state of Utah in any contract or by any other signed instrument. 
(Exhibit "A" Paragraph 5). 
9. The Defendant's do not maintain any bank accounts either 
personal or business within the state of Utah either now or in the 
past. (Exhibit "A" Paragraph 5). 
10. The Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that any 
tortious acts were committed by the Defendants in the state of 
Utah. (Exhibit C). 
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11• The contract for services that may have been rendered by 
the Plaintiff was entered into in the state of California and the 
witnesses to the event presently reside in California, and the work 
performed by the Plaintiff relates to activities pursued in 
California by the corporate Defendant. (Exhibit lfBM, Paragraph 6). 
12. All documents and business records of the Defendants are 
located in California and are not stored or secured in the state 
of Utah. (Exhibit "A" Paragraph 7; Exhibit ,fBlf Paragraph 7. 
IX. 3UMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Each of the Defendants/Appellees asserts that the District 
Court of Utah County does not have jurisdiction over him for three 
(3) separate reasons. First, the long arm statute as enacted in 
the state of Utah has not been met. Second, each of the Defendants 
separate and individual contacts with the State of Utah are not 
sufficient to give this Court personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendants sufficient to meets the requirements of the due process 
of law clause as required by both the Utah state Constitution and 
the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Finally, for the time 
periods in questions, the Plaintiff had a regular and ongoing 
business relationship within the state of California and the work 
relates to the corporate Defendants activities within the state of 
California and to require each of the Defendants to defend 
themselves in a foreign state under such circumstances is in 
violation of due process of law under both the state and federal 
constitutions. 
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X. ARGUMENT 
A. Utah/s Long arm statute does not confer general 
or personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. 
UCA 78-27-22 sets forth Utah's declared public policy in 
adopting the state's Long-Arm Statute. The stated public policy 
clearly acknowledges that "any" contact with the state of Utah does 
not meet spirit or express wording of the statute. A plain reading 
of the statute requires as a condition precedent to its use that 
each of the Defendant's contacts with the state of Utah must be 
"... significant minimal contacts...". 
Each of the Defendants claim that the District Courts of the 
state of Utah lack jurisdiction over them, and as a result, may not 
enter a money judgment them (either jointly or severally) based on 
a California commercial account. Utah's long-arm statute UCA 78-
27-24 reads as follows: 
"Any person..., who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, 
and if an individual, his personal representative, to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
claim arising from: 
1. The transaction of any business within this 
state: 
2. Contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
3. The causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or be breach of warranty; 
4. The ownership, use, or possession of any real 
estate situated in this state; 
5. Contracting to insure any person, property or 
risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting; 
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6. With respect to actions of divorce and 
separate maintenance, the maintenance in this 
state of a matrimonial domicile at the time 
the claim arose or the commission in this 
state of the act giving rise to the claim." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In order to obtain personal jurisdiction over each of the 
Defendants, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that each Defendant 
satisfies one or more of the above statutory requirements. 
UCA 78-27-26 sets forth an important limitation on the 
long-arm jurisdiction of the State of Utah. The section reads 
as follows: 
"Only claims arising from acts enumerated 
herein may be asserted against a defendant in 
an action in which jurisdiction over him is 
based upon this act." 
It is clear that only subsection (1) of Utah's long-
arm statute (UCA 78-27-24) could possibly apply in this case. 
The individual Defendants and the corporate Defendant are not 
conducting their trade or business in the state of Utah. It 
is clear that the Plaintiff is conducting its own trade 
within the state of Utah. In sharp contrast, the corporate 
Defendant does not conduct any of its automotive trade or 
business in the state of Utah. The individual defendants as 
employees of the corporate defendant have ncj business 
contacts with Utah whatsoever. The Defendants do not own 
assets in Utah nor have they entered into an insurance 
arrangement with Utah citizens. Under these facts, the long-
arm statute has not been met and the Plaintiff has failed to 
demonstrate the existence of "significant minimal contacts". 
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The state statute enumerates only six (6) situation by 
which the state of Utah can assert personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident Defendants. The statute declares that certain 
acts and certain conduct is sufficient to establish a legal 
"presence" in the state. The only applicable section for 
purposes of this case is the "transaction of business" test 
as found in subparagraph (1)/ and which is specifically 
circumscribed by the language of UCA 78-27-26. 
The Plaintiff cannot meet the "transaction of business" 
test required by the statute as against each of the three (3) 
Defendants. This is because the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently ruled that to satisfy this test each of the 
defendants must engage in a "substantial activity" with 
"some degree of continuity" in Utah. As illustrated by the 
Defendant's Affidavits, each of the Defendant's activities in 
Utah are not "substantial" and they certainly have not been 
"continuous". In fact, they have never occurred. In 
contrast, the professional business relationship arose while 
all of the parties were transacting their respective trade or 
business in the state of California. As a result the 
commercial agreement is governed by California law and the 
witnesses to the account or agreement all initially resided 
in California. From 1971 to 1974 all parties conducted all 
of their respective businesses in the state of California. 
Thereafter, the Plaintiff decided to relocate the Utah and 
continue its accounting operations here. Does this mean the 
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corporate Defendant must now be conducting its business in 
Utah too? 
In Union Ski Company v, Union Plastics Corporation. 548 
P.2d 1257 (Utah 1976), a Utah Plaintiff sued a California 
corporation for breach of a contract whereby the Defendant 
was to manufacture ski boots for the Utah Plaintiff. 
Defendant's general manager made at least four trips to Utah, 
and during one of these trips an oral understanding was 
reached between the parties within the State. This agreement 
was, with minor modification, subsequently reduced to writing 
and executed by the Defendant in California. 
The Utah Supreme Court in affirming a lower Court's 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction held that the Plaintiff 
had failed to show sufficient contacts by the Defendant in 
the State of Utah to support extra-territorial service of 
process and the resulting personal jurisdiction. The Court 
summarized the Utah law as follows: 
"In harmony with the foregoing this court has 
consistently held that the transaction of business 
within the meaning of our statute requires that the 
Defendant has engaged jn gQme substantial activity 
with some degree of continuity within this state. 
(547 P.2d at 1259.) (Emphasis added.) 
Shortly after Union Ski
 f the Utah Supreme Court decided 
Cats Rental CQBipcmy v. WftalQn Cpmpemy, 549 P.2d 707 (Utah 
1976). The Plaintiff was a Utah corporation which had leased 
a piece of heavy construction equipment to the Defendant, a 
Montana corporation. The parties had transacted business on 
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a fairly regular basis for about ten years, the contacts with 
the state of Utah usually consisting of about five (5) 
telephone conversations a year between the two parties. The 
Utah Plaintiff would ship equipment to Montana from Salt Lake 
City and it would receive payment by mail. Based upon these 
facts and relying on Union Ski
 f supra. the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Trial Court's Order quashing service of process. 
The Court's ruling indicates that the Trial Court had no 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendant under the facts of 
that case. 
In White v. Arthur Murray, Inc. . 549 P.2d 439 (Utah 1976) 
the Utah Plaintiff brought an action for fraud against the 
Defendant corporation. The corporation's activities in Utah 
consisted of (1) supplying its franchisees with the 
instructional and advertizing materials; (2) regular audits, 
either on an annual or bi-annual basis; and (3) allowing the 
franchisees to use the corporate name. Apparently, the 
Defendant did no other business within the state of Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court once again held that even these 
enumerated contacts were not sufficient to support personal 
jurisdiction over the Defendant. See also Transwestern 
Central Agency v. Morgan, 526 P.,2d 1186 (Utah 1974); Mack 
Financial corporation vt Nevafla Rental?, inc. 529 p.2d 421 
(Utah 1974). chevron Chemical Company Vr tfecham, 550 p.2d 
182 (Utah 1976). 
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In the present case the three (3) named Defendants do not 
have the same type of contact with the state of Utah which the 
Defendants in the above cited cases had. 
Even in those cases where the Utah Supreme Court has 
found personal jurisdiction over non-resident Defendants, it 
has explicitly stated that the basis for such jurisdiction 
must be clear. In Packaging Corporation of America v. Morris, 
561 P.2d 680 (Utah 1977), a creditor brought an action against 
a non-resident Defendant to recover under a guarantee 
agreement. In an opinion authored by Justice Wilkins, the 
Court held that there was personal jurisdiction over the non-
resident guarantor of the obligation. The Court was very 
careful, however, to setforth the basis for this jurisdiction 
as the opinion states: 
"In Union Ski
 r supra, this Court stated that the 
meaning of our long-arm statute...requires that the 
Defendant has engaged in some substantial activity 
with some degree of continuity within this State 
. . . Defendant/s agent was in Utah and performed 
continuous duties in Utah in overseeing the business 
of Hawkeye [the guaranteed party] and hence the 
Defendant's interests therein for most of 1971 and 
into 1972. The agent's duties and contacts were not 
sporadic and transitory. Certainly Hawkeye had 
local offices and property in Utah and the 
activities of the Defendant's agent at those offices 
constituted a substantial business presence in this 
state. (561 P.2d at 683). 
In the Morris case, the Court specifically found that 
the Defendant was substantially engaged in an ongoing business 
in Utah. It thus had an economic presence in the state of 
Utah. 
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The Morris opinion relied on the earlier case of Hill v. 
Zale Corporation, 25 Ut. 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (Utah 1971), 
where the Utah Supreme Court stated the following seven (7) 
factors are generally determinative of whether or not a non-
resident is "present" and "doing business" in the State of 
Utah: 
(1) Local offices, stores or outlets; 
(2) Personnel or employees located in Utah; 
(3) The solicitation of the general public within the 
State; 
(4) The presence of property including inventories, bank 
accounts, etc.; 
(5) The extent and frequency of business activities in 
the State; 
(6) Whether the claim asserted arose from the activities 
within Utah; 
(7) The relative hardship or convenience of the party 
in being required to litigate in Utah. 
Obviously, under the authorities and criteria cited 
above, the individual Defendants are not, and were not, 
transacting business within the state of Utah. The California 
Corporate Defendant has not even had as many contacts with the 
state of Utah as the Defendants in Union Ski. supra, Cate, 
supra, and Arthur Murray, supra, who were able to avoid the 
assertion of jurisdiction. The seven (7) factors cited above 
have not been met even on a minimal basis in this case. 
The contract for services which the present Plaintiff 
claims exist was entered into between California residents 
and it was the Plaintiff who then decided to relocate to Utah. 
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Such a unilateral act by the Plaintiff cannot be the basis for 
asserting extra-territorial personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident arising out of a transaction whose basis and roots 
(and governing law) arose in the state of California. 
The seven (7) factors are not substantially satisfied. 
The last factor raises significant constitutional issues that 
will be addressed below. 
B. Jurisdiction over the Defendants do not satisfy 
due process of law under the 14th Amendment 
of the U.g. CQnstjtutiop qy the 
state's Constitution. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution does not allow the Trial Courts 
of this state to assert extra-territorial personal 
jurisdiction over each of the three (3) the non-resident 
Defendants under the facts of this case. International Shoe 
v Washington 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed 95 (1945); 
McGee v International 355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed 2d 
223 (1957). The thrust of these decisions by the United 
States Supreme Court is that (notwithstanding the state's long 
arm statute) sufficient minimum contacts must exist within the 
foreign state in order for the state Court to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant. In this regard 
the identified minimum contacts must be substantial enough to 
justify the Defendants presence in a foreign state to defend 
a lawsuit. Absent some reasonable minimal contact with the 
foreign state (relating at least to the subject matter of the 
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litigation) our modern day concept of due process of law is 
violated. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that this minimal 
level of contact within the state must be reasonable and just 
according to traditional concepts of fairness and equity. 
Hanson v Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed 1283 
(1958). This requirement has not been met in this case. When 
the business relationship began and the agreement entered into 
all of the parties resided in the state of California. 
Therefore, each party could reasonably expect that the 
controlling law would be California law and the proper Court 
to address any grievance relating to the relationship was the 
state Courts of California. All of the parties have 
substantial and ongoing contacts with the state of California. 
The proper Court to adjudicate this controversy is located in 
Orange County California where the Plaintiff has at least one 
acknowledged customer (i.e. the corporate defendant) and where 
the other individual Defendants personally reside and where 
they supposedly entered into the "guarantee" agreement. 
Whether sufficient minimum contacts exists for federal 
constitutional issues cannot be answered by applying a fixed 
formula or rule of thumb. This Court must determine whether 
it is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this 
particular case that each of the Defendants should be required 
to defend themselves in the foreign state based on a 
transaction originally entered into in California. Being 
required to defend a law suit in a foreign state is usually 
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at a substantial cost and significant inconvenience to the 
Defendant. This strong-arm tactic is usually employed to 
drive up the cost of litigation so that settlement is based 
on the cost of the out-of-state litigation and not the merits 
of the controversy itself. In such a case the traditional 
concepts of justice and fair play is violated. 
The Courts have adopted a few tests to determine whether 
or not it is reasonable to have the Defendants put to the 
inconvenience and expense of defending themselves in the 
Courts of a foreign state. One Court has determined that the 
trial Court should determine whether the defendant engaged in 
some act or conduct by which the Defendant may have said to 
have invoked the benefits and protections of the law of the 
state now seeking jurisdiction over the party. Gray v 
American 22 111. 2d 432, 176 NE. 2d 761 (1961); Consolidated 
v Shandon 348 F. 2d. 797 (CA-7 1967). In this case# the 
Defendants have never sought the protections or benefits of 
the laws of the State of Utah nor was that even contemplated 
in 1971 when all the parties resided in the state of 
California. 
Under the Utah State Constitution Article 1 Section 7, 
the assertion of jurisdiction over these non-resident 
Defendants essentially deprives them of life, liberty, and 
property without due process of law. The Utah Supreme Court 
has long recognized that before a person can be subjected to 
specific control by the state of Utah (i.e. the taxation of 
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personal property) that person must have some recognized legal 
contact with the state of Utah. Untermyer vs. The State Tax 
Commission 102 Ut. 214, 129 P.2d 881 (Utah 1942). The 
Untermyer case involved the imposition of an excise tax on the 
ownership of stock of a domestic corporation. The stock was 
owned by a non-resident citizen who objected to the payment 
of the tax. The holding by the Utah Supreme Court which 
upheld the right of the state to tax the stock was based upon 
the premise (though artificial) that the stock of a Utah 
corporation has a sufficient tax situs within the state 
sufficient to justify the taxation of any subsequent transfer 
of that stock. Here the contact with the state of Utah is 
created by the voluntary purchase of stock of a corporation 
known to be subject to state corporate laws and state tax law. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the local Courts could 
adjudicate any controversy and that the stockholders would be 
subject to taxation in Utah. In such a case the non-resident 
alien is not deprived of property without due process of law. 
It is clear that "any" contact with the state of Utah is 
not sufficient to justify personal jurisdiction. The state 
statute requires (as required by the state's constitution) 
that the contacts be "significant". 
C. Fairness and judicial economy as an element 
of due process of law requires that 
this case be heard in California 
In determining whether or not "due process of law" is 
being afforded a nonresident Defendant and whether or not he 
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has significant minimum contacts with the state sufficient to 
require that he defend a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction, 
the Trial Court must seriously consider whether or not the 
Plaintiff has more contact with the non-resident Defendants' 
home state (California) than the Defendants have with the 
Plaintiff's home state (Utah). Absent this comparison and 
consideration "due process of law" is not truly being afforded 
a non-resident Defendant. In the present case the Plaintiff 
clearly is conducting its accounting service in California by 
rendering services to at least one (1) California customer. 
It is acknowledged that this relationship began in 1971 and 
continued for nearly 18 years. The Plaintiff is in fact 
conducting its own trade or business in California. The 
Plaintiff has for the past 18 years rendered professional 
services to customers located in California including at least 
the present corporate defendant. On the other hand, the 
Defendant Laray Company (and its employee Defendants) are not 
supplying auto parts to the Plaintiff or any other resident 
of Utah. Furthermore, the individually named Defendants have 
no contact with Utah whatsoever (other than the present 
litigation). It is far more reasonable to have the Plaintiff 
seek redress of its grievance in California, rather than to 
impose a significant hardship on three (3) other persons or 
entities to defend in a foreign state. 
Judicial economy weighs heavily in favor of having a 
California Court decide all issues rather than bifurcating 
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the case into multiple suits because the individual named 
Defendants are clearly not subject to the long arm statute of 
the state of Utah. Furthermore, California Code Law is the 
choice of law in this dispute and California Courts are much 
more capable of correctly interpreting California law than the 
Utah Judicial System which has little if any experience in 
applying California law. The Defendants can reasonably and 
properly expect that a California Trial Court is much more 
capable and able to correctly apply California law than the 
state Courts of Utah. Any defense mounted in a foreign 
jurisdiction puts the litigant to the cost of educating the 
trial Court on foreign law. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should rule that 
Utah Code Annotated 78-27-24 is not applicable in this case 
because the Defendants are not transacting any business within 
the State of Utah. In this regard the Defendants do not have 
a continuing and active presence in the state of Utah 
sufficient to warrant personal jurisdiction over them either 
jointly or severally. 
The Court should also rule that the assertion of 
jurisdiction by the Courts of the state of Utah over each of 
Defendants under the facts of this case would violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that 
it would deprive the Defendants of due process of law. The 
Defendants do not have sufficient minimum contacts with the 
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state of Utah sufficient to require that they incur the 
expense and inconvenience of adjudicating the Plaintiff's 
claim in a foreign state especially where the Plaintiff has 
a history of economic business contacts with the state of 
California for the past 18 years. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this jfr^day of January, 1991. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document to: 
Jeffrey N. Walker 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by placingtjfie same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid 
on this Jx^day of January, 1991. 
LARAY-1 .BRF 
LARAY-AP.BRF 
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Tab A 
Mark J. Perrizo, Esq, 
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZO 
10901 Paramount Boulevard 
Downey, California 90241 
(213) 923-4513 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, : 
Plaintiff, : 
: DECLARATION OF 
vs. l RAYMOND BOAL 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND : Civil No. 900400079 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., : 
Defendants. : 
I, RAYMOND BOAL, state: 
I am a named individual defendant in the instant 
action. I am over the age of eighteen and have personal 
knowledge of all statements made in this Declaration and if 
called as a witness, I could and would competently testify 
to the following: 
1. I ai the current duly elected President of LARAY 
COMPANY, INC., the primary defendant named in this lawsuit, 
and have served continuously as President since 1985. 
2. LARAY COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter referred as 
ffLARAYlf) is a corporation duly organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of California having its principal and 
only place of business in La Habra, California, currently 
located at 1801 E. Lambert Road. 
3. I am and have at all times since the initial 
incorporation of LARAY resided in the State of California. 
I currently reside at 817 Via Amadeo, San Dimas, California 
91773. 
4. When served with Summons and Complaint in this 
action I was not present in the State of Utah. I have never 
resided in or been domiciled in the State of Utah. I have 
not consented in writing or orally at any time to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Courts. I am not now or have 
I ever done business in the State of Utah. I have not 
caused any act or omission or effect in the State of Utah. 
I have no ownership, use or possession of any property real 
or personal in the State of Utah. 
5. During my continuous tenure as President of LARAY, 
LARAY has not been incorporated in Utah nor has it done any 
business in Utah. At no time has LARAY consented to or 
appeared in any action in the State of Utah. LARAY has no 
agent in Utah nor has LARAY caused any act, omission, or 
effect in Utah. LARAY has no ownership use or possession of 
any property real or personal in the State of Utah. 
6. In or about 1971, in the County of Orange, State 
of California, LARAY through its then President, JAMES A. 
BOAL, JR., orally agreed with Plaintiff to have certain 
accounting work performed. At that time LARAY was operating 
and doing business as an automotive body shop supply 
business in La Habra, California. At said time Plaintiff 
was a resident of Santa Monica, California, and doing 
business as an accounting or bookkeeping service. All 
witnesses to this original oral agreement were and currently 
are located and reside in California with the exception of 
Plaintiff. 
7, Plaintiff moved his residence to Utah in 
approximately 1974. At all times prior thereto and at the 
time the contract was entered into Plaintiff resided in 
California. Even after Plaintiff moved to Utah, Plaintiff 
traveled to California to pick up books and records of LARAY 
and meet with its principal officers. The books and records 
included check stubs, payroll reports, monthly sales reports 
and copies of loan contracts. In instances when Plaintiff 
was unable to physically pick up such records, we were 
requested to mail same to him. At no time did we personally 
deliver any records to Plaintiff in Utah. All of the 
transactions that generated the aforementioned documents 
were generated in California for use in California, 
including the reports and returns provided by Plaintiff. 
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the 
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed this 11th day of April, 1990, at Downey, 
California. 
YMOND BQ 
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CAT. NO NN00627 
TO 1944 CA (9 -84 ) 
(Individual) 
STATE OF CALIFORJ 
COUNTY OF 
T1COR TITLE INSURANG 
riA 
On 
ss. 
"7 
7sU * /(• /9fo 
w said Stare, personally appeared _ 
JAMES 
before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in a 
A , BOAL, J R . 
, personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be 
the person whose name * f subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that A*- exe-
cuted the same. 
WITNESS my han>^ft>official seal. 
Signarur< 
l £ 3 n Man^WiBU. AP?! D ^ L 
(This area for official notarial seal) 
t 
CAT. NO. NN00627 
TO 1944 CA (9 -84 ) 
(Individual) 
STATE OF CALIFO 
COUNTY OF SS. 
On 
said S rite, personally appeared 
TICOR TITL6 INSURANCE 
RAYMOND BOAL 
before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in ai 
M J 
a. 
< 
I 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfaaory evidence to be 
the person whose name f S subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that As exe-
cuted the same. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
Signature 
gniimmmmi!n!i!2!miit!iiHnHHUfn;H!!«!?!nnHi!!ii!i 
OFF'CiALSSAL 
B(%*«*m MARK J. PERRiZO 
- -— * NOTARY PUBLIC-CALIFORNIi 
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN 
s ^t^r LOS ANGELES COUNTY 
1 My Commission Expires June 26 ,1992 
SUitiuufiuuiumiiuiisiiiitiiMiiiiinuiiuuiiiuiiiiiiuiiin 
(This area for official notarial seal) 
TabB 
Mark 3 Perrizo, Esq. 
WILSON, WILSON & PERRIZO 
10901 Paramount Boulevard 
Downey, California 90241 
(213) 923-4513 
Attorneys for Defendants 
"i i i I'Tii/i i:"GUP7fn JTJ D " C1A ,1 DISTRICT CGuRi" 01- i! i" An CGuNT 
STATE OF UTAH 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARAY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF 
JAMES A. BOAL, JR. 
I, JAMES A. BOAL, JR., state: 
I a nil in in ai in e i :1 i n d i v i d \ i a 1 11 e [• e 11 cl a 111, j i m II f i fj 111 s r . "i r 11 
action. I am over the age ot eighteen and have personal 
knowledge of all statements made ir. this Declaration and if 
c'dl lei I .-is ,i! witness, J en .i Id ami w ,ui M competently testify 
to the following: 
1. I am the former President of LARAY COMPANY, INC., 
1 primary defendant named in th i s lawsuit, and 1 served 
continuously in that capacity from the initial incorporation 
of th€ company tin l98F,i when RAYMOND BOA I bwramu President; . 
2. LARAY COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter referred as 
,fLARAY11) corporation duly organized and existing under 
1 
only place of business in La Habra, California, currently 
located at 1801 E. Lambert Road. 
3. I am and have at all times since the initial 
incorporation of LARAY resided in the State of California. 
I currently reside at 1401 Arbolita, La Habra, California 
90631. 
4. When served with Summons and Complaint in this 
action I was not present in the State of Utah. I have never 
resided in or been domiciled in the State of Utah. I have 
not consented in writing or orally at any time to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Courts. I am not now or have 
I ever done business in "the State of Utah. I have not 
caused any act or omission or effect in the State of Utah. 
I have no ownership, use or possession of any property real 
or personal in the State of Utah. 
5. During my continuous tenure as President of LARAY, 
LARAY has not been incorporated in Utah nor has it done any 
business in Utah. At no time has LARAY consented to or 
appeared in any action in the State of Utah. LARAY has no 
agent in Utah nor has LARAY caused any act, omission, or 
effect in Utah. LARAY has no ownership use or possession of 
any property real or personal in the State of Utah. 
6. In or about 1971, in the County of Orange, State 
of California, through myself as President of said 
corporation, LARAY orally agreed with Plaintiff to have 
certain accounting work performed. At that time LARAY was 
operating and doing business as an automotive body shop 
2 
supply business in La Habra, California. At said time 
Plaintiff was a resident of Santa Monica, California, and 
doing business as an accounting or bookkeeping service. All 
witnesses to this original oral agreement were and currently 
are located and reside in California with the exception of 
Plaintiff. 
7. Plaintiff moved his residence to Utah in 
approximately 1974. At all times prior thereto and at the 
time the contract was entered into Plaintiff resided in 
California. Even after Plaintiff moved to Utah, Plaintiff 
traveled to California to pick up books and records of LARAY 
and meet with its principal officers. The books and records 
included check stubs, payroll reports, monthly sales reports 
and copies of loan contracts. In instances when Plaintiff 
was unable to physically pick up such records, we were 
requested to mail same to him. At no time did we personally 
deliver any records to Plaintiff in Utah. All of the 
transactions that generated the aforementioned documents 
were generated in California for use in California, 
including the reports and returns provided by Plaintiff. 
I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the 
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed this 11th day of April, 1990, at Downey, 
California. 
t 
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CAT. NO NN00627 
TO 1944 CA (9 -84 ) 
(Individual) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE 
On 
.} ss. 
< /f} tffo , 
said State', personally appeared JAMES A . BOAL, J R . 
before me  the undersigned, a Notary Public in and fo 
— , personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be 
the person whose name ' f subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that A^ exe-
cuted the same. 
WITNESS my han^n>official seal. 
Signatun 
«= E%LZl*t& A M « ^ P , ^ A L SEAL = 
I f f ^ f l l i J^^RKJ. PFRRI7« I 
••asatasSSgJ 
(This area for official notarial seal) 
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CAT NO. NN0O627 
TO 1944 CA (9 -84 ) 
(Individual) 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF ss. 
On ^ «, /?r* 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE 
wk 
before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and fo 
said State, personally appeared _ RAYMOND BOAL 
, personally known to me or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be 
the person whose name fs subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that As exe-
cuted the same. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
Signature 
animmnnimnnnniiiHHiiHiininMnnninniiniuuii!)))^ 
tmSm MARK J. PERRIZO 1 
EHtMKff i? NOTARY PUBLIC-CALIFORNIA = 
§ V ^ T O V PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN E 
= ^ S g ^ LOS ANGELES C0UNT7 5 
s My Commission Expires June 26,1992 I 
SUlllUU!tUUIUUilUll!IUIIIIl«itUUilUlllliHltllUiillllHIIUIFE 
(This area for official notarial seal) 
TabC 
Jeffrey N. Walker (USB #5556) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 8. McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
150C First Interstate Plata 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (SOI) 521-3200 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICI uirth L 'v.- v ,«. x 
STATE Or 
KAMDAR & COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
LAP.AY COMPANY, INC.; RAYMOND 
BOAL; and JAMES A. BOAL, JR., 
Defendants 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i 1 
J one f 
Flair.t-'" -3 i. I- „ , 
1. P1 a i n t iff F ^ ~i :•r * i s a pa r t n e r s h i p o r g a n i z e d 
u n d e r thfj laws of the S t a i r of l.^jh w i t h i t s p r i n c i p a l pla.ce c-i 
b l l M U L ' h l j I  III I II i l l JL , li , M i * "1 L I '"I i. I i 
2 . P1 a i n t i f f I s i nf o rmed an d b e l i e ve s a: i d t h e r e o n 
f e i i d a: i \ I a: : a y C o 11 :: " (" I a :i • 3 > "* ' } i s « b 1 1 s 1 r e s 5 
organization with its principal place of business in Orange 
County, State of California. 
3. Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon 
alleges that the defendant Raymond Bcal is an individual and 
current president of Laray and resides in Los Angeles County, 
State of California. 
4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon 
alleges that the defendant James A. Bcal, Jr, is an individual 
and former president of Laray and resides in Orange County, 
State of California. 
5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therecr 
alleges that the defendants Raymond Bcal and James A. Bcal, Jr. 
are guarantors of the debts of Laray. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
6. Plaintiff is inforrred and believes and thereon 
alleges that this Court has jurisdiction over the matters 
alleged herein pursuant to the Utah Code Anno. Section 76-27-24 
(1953, as amended) in that the defendants' transaction cf 
business and contracting for services with the plaintiff 
occurred within the State of Utah. 
7. Venue of this action is properly vested in this 
court pursuant to Utah Code Anno. Section 76-13-1 (1953, BS 
amended) in that the claims alleged herein occurred as a result 
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11. In or about 1971 through 1583, the plaintiff did 
rendered Services for Laray, submitted billings and accounting 
statements on a monthly, quarterly or yearly basis to Laray for 
these Services and Laray paid the plaintiff pursuant tc the 
billing and accounting statements, pursuant tc the Contracts. 
12. In or about early March, 1989/ the defendant 
James A, Boal, Jr., then president of Laray, informed the 
plaintiff that once the last quarter of the 1988 financial and 
tax services which the plaintiff was in the process of 
completing were finished, as a result of an anticipated change 
in management of Laray, the plaintiff's Services would be nc 
longer required, and requested a final bill and accounting for 
all outstanding unpaid Services. 
13. In response to the defendant James A. Boal, Jr.'s 
request, on or about March 24, 1989, that the plaintiff 
submitted to Laray a final bill and accounting for unpaid 
Services rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray, pursuant 
to the Contracts, in the amount of Twenty Six Thousand One 
Hundred Ninety Four Dollars ($26,194,00) plus accruing interest 
and service charges. A copy of said final billing and 
accounting statement is attached hereto as Exhioit "A" and 
incorporated by reference herein. 
14. On or about May 12, 1989, the defendant Raymond 
Boal, as the new president of Laray, replied by letter to the 
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high and that Laray h3d located other "accounting services" 
which would work for less. A copy of said letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit MEM and incorporated by reference herein. 
18- On or about August 16, 1989, the plaintiff, by 
letter, again attempted to encourage Laray to fulfill its 
commitments under the Contracts and pay the plaintiff for the 
Services it had rendered for the exclusive benefit of Laray* 
This letter further informed Laray that the defendant Raymond 
Seal's earlier acknowledgments that the plaintiff had performed 
substantial financial, tax and consulting services and the 
corresponding amount Laray was willing to pay failed to account 
for all the Services so rendered, as noted in the March 24, 
19B9 billing and accounting statement. A copy of said letter 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and inccrporatea by reference 
herein. 
19. The defendants have failed to make any further 
payment in accordance to the Contracts between the plaintiff 
and Laray for the Services rendered by the plaintiff for the 
exclusive benefit of Laray. 
20. The plaintiff has performed all of its 
obligations under the terms of the Contracts. 
21. The plaintiff has demanded that the defendants 
pay pursuant to the Contracts, but the defendants have and 
continued to refuse to pay such amounts or any portion thereof. 
-6-
22. As a result o£ the defendants' failure to pay the 
amounts owed to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled tc 
recover from the defendants the amount of Twenty Four Tnousand 
Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00), together with 
interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as allowed by law 
from the date of the defendant's breach of the Contracts, and 
judgment should be entered against the defendants and in favor 
of the plaintiff in that amount. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendants as set forth hereinafter in Plaintiff's Prayer for 
Relief• 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Unjust Enrichment) 
23. The plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 22 of this 
complaint as though set forth in full herein. 
24. The defendants have been unjustly enriched in the 
amount of Twenty Four Thousand Three Hundred Tnirty Six Dollars 
($24,336.00) as a result of the defendants* failure to pay for 
the Services rendered by the plaintiff as alleged herein, 'and 
in equity and good conscience, the defendants should not be 
permitted to enjoy the benefits of said Services, and the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendants the amount 
by which the defendants have been unjustly enriched* 
25. For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants 
are liable to the plaintiff in the amount of Twenty Four 
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336.00), 
together with interest thereon at the highest, legal rate as 
allowed by law from the date of the defendant's wrongful 
conduct, and judgment should be entered against the defendants 
and in favor of the plaintiff in that amount. 
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff demands judgment against the 
defendant as set forth in Plaintiff's Prayer fcr Relief. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff pray: 
1. For judgment against the defendants on each of the 
Claims fcr Relief as noted herein in the amount of Twenty Four 
Thousand Three Hundred Thirty Six Dollars ($24,336,00), 
together with interest thereon at the highest legal rate from 
the date of the defendants' breach and/or wrongful conduct; 
-8-
2. For an award of a reasonable attorney's fees, 
court costs and expenses incurred in this action; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court 
may deem equitable and just under the ciresistances. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a v of January, 1990. 
JONES. WALDO, | HOLBROOK & M^TCNCUGK 
/ . .1 i ^ 
By :^M \hv ^ 
J£?£}fey lfl. Walker 
Attoi^n-ev4 f o r P l a i n t i f f J 
jnw 2 1 8 / p b 
- 9 „ 
KAMDAR & CO. 
10 SOUTH STATE STREET 
LINDQN, UT 84042 
March 24, 1989 
James A. Boal, Jr., President 
Laray Co., Inc. 
P. 0. Box 462 
La Habra, CA 90631 
Accounting services rendered: 
Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 86-37. . . .$ 5,580. 
Preparation of Corp. Tax Returns Fy 87-88. . . . 4,983. 
Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 86-87 4,052, 
Bank Reporting to Mitsubishi 87-88 . . . . . . . 4,152, 
Comparative Fianacials 86-87 & 87-86 3,052. 
General Ledger Work 7-1-87 to 12-31-88 2,700. 
Financials of the Principals 1-1-88 928. 
Out of Pocket costs * 747, 
Total services rendered $ 26,194. 
If the total payment is not received in 30 days, a late charge of 
12.00 per cent will be added to the unpaid balance. 
The billing is payable upon receipt. 
>P7TO7-' 
P.O. BOX 452 
MAY 12, 1959 
KM CAR & CO. 
10 SOUTH STATE STF£ET 
UNDCtl, UTAH &C42 
R£: ACCcurrrNc SERVICES R c a x s o : 
FFEpARATICtt 0? CCRP. TAX RETURNS FY 87-&S 6,983. 
BANK R£roRm J^C TO MITSUBISHI 87-8-S 4 , i52. 
CCUPAPwtfrVE FIANACIALS 87-SS 1,526. 
CC^-Al LEDGER V.ORK 7-1-87 TO 12-31-83 2,700. 
rEiANcms or TIE PJUTCIPALS I - I - S S ' 925. 
TOTAL 14,239.00 
L1STCD ABOVE IS HE TOTAL A'D^TT OCT TO K/iS\R & CC. BY 
LARAY CO., FOR ACCOlVmtt SET/ICES. PASE*T WILL 5£ li'JX 
111 SIX INSIALU1CNT5 AT 2,331.50 . 
SUCEKELY, 
/ 
/ / 
PRESHSfT 
RB/rl 
PAY-
TO 
THE 
ORncn 
OF 
n% AUTO BODY SPECIALTIES 6664330 18C1 E. LAMBERT RO. 714-092-6560 P. O BOX 462 213-694-1033 LA HABRA, CA 90631 
UtmZL238Isoi ' I J ••«!>•> 
THE OAUK Of CAl.rRjflNlA 
2001 w a u winner efvd, 
r 
L 
i 
DATE 
05/12/89 
A M O U N T 
$2381-50 
i^JDftR & 0 0 . 
ii"Oi5?i« i"1 •: i3Hoaiossi :so iM'Sui^ua"' .-•0000 5 38 L50.-
t JY ' 07 
I u 
• / : . 
9 
»i u ..:i i '«r j. i- \ . 'v« W~S ^ V. I. V ;.< *•> ~ c..v' 
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THOMAS S TAYLOR 
ROBERT L MOODY 
D EUGENE THORNE 
of Course! 
KAY ALDRtCH LINDSAY 
i LOR, MOODY &THORNI i 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
FORMERLY 
CHRISTENSEN TAYLOR & MOODY 
2W> NORTH CANYON ROAD 
COUNTRY CLUB COURT 
PO BOX 1466 
PROVO UTAH 8«60< 
<S 
TELEPHONE 
'50'} 573 2 ^ : 
f^x
 v^i; vu> ' 
July 7, 1989 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company, Inc. 
P.O. Box 462 
La Habra, CA 90631 
re: Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Boal: 
Your memo dated May 12, 1989, regarding accounting 
services rendered by Kamdar & Company has been brought to my 
office. I return a copy of that letter together with a copy of 
Kamdar & Company's billing, dated March 24, 1939* The amount 
shown on the March 24, 1989, billing is the amount owed to Kar.dar 
& Company and not as characterized by yourself. 
Should you opt to make monthly installments as you have 
suggested in your memo dated May 12, 1939, a 121 interest charge 
will be added. 
Mr, Kamdar is sorry that you have chosen not to 
continue using his services but that is not a reason to excuse 
you from payment of the services previously rendered. 
Should this account net be paid in a reasonable pencd 
of time, I have been instructed to turn it over for colleccion to 
correspondent counsel in California, 
Should you have any questions concerning this matter 
please address them to this office* 
RLM:cjc 
Enclosure 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody 
THOMAS s TAYLOR 
ROBERT I MOODY 
D EUCHNETHORNS 
of Ceumr! 
KAY ALDRlCH LINDSAY 
'A,I*LOR, MOODY & THORN. P.^. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
FORMERLY 
CHRISTcNSEN. TAYLOR & MOODY 
2S75 NORTH CANYON ROAD 
COUNTRY CLUB COURT 
PO BOX 1466 
PROVO. UTAH &4GC* 
TELIPhCNE 
rsei, pyi'it 
FAX (WO 5 7 *-« 
J u l y 2 1 , 1989 
LARAY COMPANY, INC. 
P.O. Box 462 
LaHabra, CA 90631 
RE: Kamdar & Company vs. Laray Company, Inc. 
Gentlemen: 
Enclosed is Kamdar & Company's billing showing a credit 
of your recent payment and the current unpaid balance. Demand is 
hereby made upon you to take care of this matter within thirty 
(30) days to avoid the necessity of this being referred to 
correspondent counsel for legal proceedings. 
Should you have questions concerning this matter please 
address them to this office* 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody <? 
Attorney at Law 
RLM:jsp 
Enclosure 
AUG 4 1383 
P.O. BOX 462 • LA HASRA. CA 5063* 
July 25, 1989 
Robert L. Moody 
Taylor, Moody & Thome, PC 
2525 North Canyon Rd. 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Refrence: Kamdar Company vs Laray Ccopany: 
Your letter dated July 21, I9S9 
Inc. 
Mr. Moody: 
With respect to the matter at contest, it is our position that a 
compromise agreement be once again considered. It is our contention 
that there was a vast disparity between the nature of services rendered 
and the corresponding fees charged by Mr. Kamdar. We offer as evidence 
the dearth of documentation and product provided co us for Mr. Kamdarfs 
effort during the billing period. As a point of refrence, under the 
exact parallel circumstances, our present accounting services, which 
are provided by a Certified Public Accountant, are nowhere near the 
level of cost imposed by Mr. Kamdar, 
Enclosed is our original letter of compromise for which a corres-
ponding payment and negocition of such payment has been accomplished 
If the above terms are not acceptable to your client we suggest that 
whatever legal remedies may incur under the circumstances be pursued. 
Additionally, for your files, there is an interplay between the 
subject billing for professional services and a promissory demand note 
due to the principal owner of our Company. To avoid $ compromise of our 
position with respect to this note, (face value $15,000), we ask. an 
offset to our obligation to that of your clients. 
Very truly yours, 
Ray Boal-^ 
President 
rl/RB 
1A01 £AST LAMBERT RO LA. HASRA, CALIFORNIA 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNS ?.C. 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW f 
FORMERLY 
THOMAS 5. TAYLOR CHRlSTENSEN. TAYLOR i< MOODY 
ROBERT I MOODY_
 2 W ^ NORTH CANYON ROAD 
COUNTRY flL'H COUH! O KUGf,\C THOKS'E 
KAV ALDKICH LINDSAY PROVO. UTAH KUCT. FAX (60!) $?>-02« 
August 16, 1989 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company/ Inc. 
P.O. Box 462 
La Ilabra, CA 90631 
re: Kamdar v. LaRay Company, Inc. 
Dear Mr• Boal: 
Thank you for your letter of July 25, 1989, together 
with a copy of your letter addressed to Kamdar & Company, dated 
May 12, 1969. 
As you can appreciate it is difficult for either myself 
or Mr. Kamdar to compare what you're presently paying a CPA to 
what you previously paid Kamdar & Company. We have no way of 
knowing what the CPA is doing at the present time but we do know 
what Mr. Kamdar did in the past and we do know that for many 
years he provided services and was paid the fees and it is only 
after the fact that you want to adjust the payments to him. We 
do not think that that is appropriate. 
Referring to your recap cf the accounting services-
rendered in your letter dated May 12, 1989, you have' failed to 
include the 1986-1987 preparation of corporate tax returns in the 
sum of $5,580.00 and you have failed to include the 1986-1957 
bank reporting services whicn tctallv-d £.4,052.00. If you would 
have included those figures your total would have been 
$23/921.00. It is my opinion that contractually you're obligated 
in this amount. 
We appreciate the spirit of your willingness to try and 
resolve this matter as set forth in your letter of July 25, 1983^ 
and in that same spirit it is our suggestion that the ir.acter be 
compromised as follows; 
(a) That you offset the $15,000.00 note Mr. 
Kamdar owes your Company. 
Ray Boal, Jr., President 
LaRay Company, Inc. 
August 16, 1989 
Page 2 
(b) That you pay Mr. Kamdar $6,600.00 in monthly 
payments of $2,200.00 per month over the next three months* 
Your considering this matter and prompt reply will be 
appreciated. 
Yours very truly, 
Robert L. Moody / 
RLM:cjc 
cc: Kamdar & Company 
TabD 
Whenever any such nonresident doing business as 
provided in the preceding section [Section 78-27-20] 
shall fail to file such certificate, or such manager, 
superintendent or agent designated in such certifi-
cate cannot be found within the state of Utah, service 
of process upon such nonresident in any action aris-
ing out of the conduct of his business may be had by 
serving any person employed by or acting as agent for 
such nonresident. 1953 
78-27-22. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Pur-
pose of provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determina-
tion, that the public interest demands the state pro-
vide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who, through certain 
significant minimal contacts with this state, incur 
obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protec-
tion. This legislative action is deemed necessary be-
cause of technological progress which has substan-
tially increased the flow of commerce between the 
several states resulting in increased interaction be-
tween persons of this state and persons of other 
states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum pro-
tection to citizens of this state, should be applied so as 
to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to 
the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 1969 
78-27-23. Jurisdict ion over nonresidents — Def-
initions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individ-
ual, firm, company, association, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within 
this state" mean activities of a nonresident per-
son, his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the 
state of Utah. 1969 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts 
submitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who 
in person or through an agent does any of the follow-
ing enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an indi-
vidual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, 
or risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in 
the mari ta l relationship, within this state not-
withstanding subsequent departure from the 
state; or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim, so long as tha t act is not 
sibility for child support. 1987 
78-27-25. Jurisdict ion over nonresidents — Ser-
vice of process . 
Service of process on any party outside the state 
may be made pursuant to the applicable provisions of 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Service of summons and of a copy of the complaint, 
if any, may also be made upon any person located 
without this state by any individual over 21 years of 
age, not a party to the action, with the same force and 
effect as though the summons had been personally 
served within this state. No order of court is required. 
An affidavit of the server shall be filed with the court 
stat ing the time, manner and place of service. The 
court may consider the affidavit, or any other compe-
tent proofs, in determining whether proper service 
has been made. 
Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to 
limit or affect the right to serve process in any other 
manner provided by law. 1969 
78-27-26. Jurisdict ion over nonresidents — 
Only c laims arising from enumerated 
acts m a y be asserted. 
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein 
may be asserted against a defendant in an action in 
which jurisdiction over him is based upon this act. 
1969 
78-27-27. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — De-
fault judgments. 
No default shall be entered until the expiration of 
at least thirty days after service. A default judgment 
rendered on service may be set aside only on a show-
ing which would be timely and sufficient to set aside 
a default judgment rendered on personal service 
within this state. 1969 
78-27-28. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — 
When may be exercised. 
Subject to the applicable statute of limitations, ju-
risdiction established under this act shall be exer-
cised regardless of when the claim arose. 1969 
78-27-29 to 78-27-31. Superseded. 1983 
78-27-32. Release or settlement of personal in-
jury claim — When voidable. 
(1) Any release of liability or settlement agree-
ment entered into within a period of fifteen days from 
the date of an occurrence causing physical injury to 
any person, or entered into prior to the initial dis-
charge of this person from any hospital or sanitarium 
in which the injured person is confined as a result of 
the injuries sustained in the occurrence, is voidable 
by the injured person, as provided in this act. 
(2) Notice of cancellation of the release or settle-
ment agreement, together with any payment or other 
consideration received in connection with this release 
or agreement shall be mailed or delivered to the party 
to whom the release or settlement agreement was 
given, by the later of the following dates: 
(a) within fifteen days from the date of the oc-
currence causing the injuries which are subject of 
the settlement agreement or liability release; or 
(b) within fifteen days after the date of the in-
